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Design Basis Threats (DBTs) are summarised statements derived from a threat assessment for 
which a physical protection system (PPS) is planned and designed. This article describes the 
development of a DBT for the Irradiation Facility at the Centre for Applied Radiation Science and 
Technology (CARST) in Mafikeng, based on its threat and its risk as a radioactive source. The 
purpose of the DBT was to serve as a threat assessment technique, providing a basis for planning 
a PPS by operators of the centre. A competent authority for nuclear security then gives approval 
for the implementation of the physical protection plan. The DBT assessment methodology is an 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommended method for designing security measures 
corresponding to the categories of radioactive sources. The higher the risk, the more secure the 
facility should be.  
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A Design Basis Threat (DBT) describes the 
summary of attributes and characteristics 
of potential insider and/or external 
lawbreakers, who might attempt sabotage 
or the unauthorised removal of nuclear or 
radioactive material, against which a physical 
protection system (PPS) should be designed.1 
Development of a DBT is important because it 
enables nuclear facility operators to protect and 
secure nuclear and other radioactive materials 
with associated facilities and activities. The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
through its information circular on Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear 
Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4), described how 
to develop a notional DBT.2 A number of IAEA 
member states, recognising the importance 
of the DBT tool, requested that workshops be 
organised and the method for development, 
maintainance and usage of a DBT be 
presented. In May 2009 148 states ratified the 
final document, which describes the processes 
for formulating a DBT.
Physical protection of facilities should be 
based on up-to-date evaluations of threats, 
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encompassing all those identified by a state’s 
security agencies.3 These evaluations are 
formalised through a threat assessment 
process. A DBT can then be derived from 
this process to facilitate the development 
of protection mechanisms for the facility. A 
DBT describes the motivation, intentions 
and capabilities of potential lawbreakers and 
uses these to inform the protection systems. 
A DBT also describes the attributes and 
characteristics of potential insider (current 
employees at the facility) and outsider (a group 
of criminals or former disgruntled employees) 
lawbreakers who might plan or attempt a 
malicious act. These malicious acts may 
include unauthorised removal or sabotage of 
a facility’s nuclear assets, which should be 
protected and secured through a designed 
and evaluated PPS. The DBT would also serve 
as a deterrent to a lawbreaker who wishes 
to carry out a malicious act, because of its 
use in the design and evaluation of PPS. It is 
therefore essential that a facility’s protection 
is appropriate and that those with access to it 
have proper authorisation, in accordance with 
national laws and regulations, and the physical 
means to protect it.
This article describes the development of a 
DBT, and summarises the statements from the 
threat assessment for the Irradiation Facility at 
the Centre for Applied Radiation Science and 
Technology (CARST) in Mafikeng. It considers 
the consequences of a possible security event, 
such as unauthorised access or sabotage of 
the radioactive source housed in one of the 
centre’s buildings, as well as the need for a 
well-designed and evaluated PPS. 
Risk assessment
A risk assessment is a rational and orderly 
approach to problem identification and 
probability determination. It is a method 
for estimating the expected loss from 
the occurrence of an adverse event. 
Risk assessments will never be a precise 
methodology, because they are about 
estimation and probabilities.4 CARST has at its 
disposal critical equipment used in its training 
and research work. In any security event 
affecting the assets of the facility, the centre 
stands the chance of suffering economic loss, 
since these assets are worth millions of rands. 
In addition, significant human and physical 
resources may be needed to decontaminate 
the centre after a possible breach.
Most irradiation facilities conduct routine 
risk assessments in order to determine if 
their security systems are adequate. Risk 
assessments produce different results for 
different facilities, but generally always 
consider the likelihood of a negative event, 
in this case a security incident and its 
consequences. Security risk can be measured 
using the equation:5
 R=PA x (1–PE ) x C  (1)
where:
• R is the risk to the facility in the event of an 
adversary getting access to or stealing 
 critical assets
• PA is the probability of an attack during a 
particular period
• PE is the effectiveness of the PPS against the 
identified threat
• 1–PE is the vulnerability of the PPS against 
the identified threat  
• C is the consequence value.6
The probability of an adversary attack during 
a particular period (PA) can be very difficult to 
determine, but the probability ranges from 0 
(no chance at all of an attack) to 1.0 (certainty 
of an attack). Critical assets, the loss of which 
would have serious consequences, still require 
protection if the PA value is low, and so are still 
given high priority.7 
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Threat assessment
The threat assessment of a facility’s assets 
and radioactive sources is the basis on which 
a DBT statement is formulated and a physical 
protection system designed. For the DBT of the 
CARST in Mafikeng, selected crimes recorded 
in close proximity to the centre (in towns A and 
B) over a three-year period were taken into 
account. This is because such crimes may be 
attempted and committed at the centre itself. 
An analysis of the possible consequences of 
unauthorised acquisition of the radioactive 
sources from CARST was performed. 
Based on vulnerability analysis for specific 
sources, an assessment of the risk was made. 
The level of this risk determined the security 
measures required to protect the sources. The 
higher the risk, the more security capability 
is required. CARST is located on a university 
campus. The centre is located between an 
undergraduate residence and the Animal Health 
department of the university. The university is 
located in Town A, with Town B – the provincial 
capital – in close proximity. The centre has four 
permanent workers, two of whom live in Town 
A and two in Town B. Crime types considered 
a serious threat to the facility committed in and 
around towns A and B informed the DBT.
In the fairly recent past there have been a 
number of infiltrations of the Pelindaba nuclear 
research facility located outside Pretoria. A 
portable computer was stolen in 2005, while 
in 2007 a group of armed men broke into the 
facility at different points, deactivated a number 
of security layers, entered the control room for 
45 minutes and escaped, but without removing 
any nuclear material.8 In 2012 another violation 
of protective measures at the facility occurred 
and was described as an act of ‘common’ 
criminality.9 The hundreds of kilograms of highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) held at the facility, which 
could be weaponised, may have been stored 
in ‘locked-down’ locations but the breaches 
remain a concern. Effective protection systems 
should deter adversaries from even attempting to 
access such facilities.10 Instead, these infiltrations 
re-emphasise the need for a graded formulation 
of threats for all nuclear facilities, based on the 
potential harm that their uncontrolled nuclear 
material or radioactive sources can cause. 
This is crucial, because nuclear hazards caused 
by the sabotage or unauthorised removal of 
nuclear materials and other radioactive materials 
can be devastating. Any possible criminality near 
such a facility must also be considered a threat 
to it. 
The DBT on which this article is based considered 
selected crimes recorded in towns A and B. In 
2013 towns A and B recorded 4 349 and 4 107 
crimes respectively.11 In 2014, 3 908 crimes 
were recorded in town A and 4 172 in town B.12 
In 2015, 4 395 crimes were recorded in town A 
and 4 139 in town B.13 There are 78 towns and 
cities in the province in which towns A and B are 
located. Of these, towns A and B accounted for 
86% and 58% respectively of the 12 selected 
crimes recorded in 45 police stations in the 
province, as presented in tables 1 and 2. 
Although crime is notoriously difficult to measure, 
with crime reported to police offering only a 
partial view of actual crime types and rates, it is 
common practice to use official crime records to 
inform DBT analyses.14 
The last national census in South Africa was 
carried out in 2011. It records a population of 
38 297 for Town A and 291 500 for Town B. 
Statistics South Africa reports that the population 
growth rate from 2001–2011 was +1.17% 
per year. If the same is applied to Town A, its 
population in 2017 would be approximately 
41 073, and Town B’s 312 626.15
By using this data, together with police crime 
statistics, approximate crime rates can be 
calculated for each town, which can in turn 
inform the DBT.
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Note: Crimen injuria is the act of unlawfully and 
intentionally impairing the dignity or privacy of 
another person. Stalking a person deprives him/
her of privacy.
The crimes in the tables were selected due to 
their nature. Firearms and ammunition can be 
used to enter the centre. Robbery and burglary 
targeting the houses of centre employees 
may lead to the theft of vital information, keys 
or pass codes for entry to the centre. Crime 
committed at or against the centre could 
be carried out under the influence of drugs. 
Lawbreakers may stalk or kidnap an employee 
or their family member in order to extract 
information or to aid their entry to the centre. 
Vehicles stolen through carjacking may be used 
Crime
Town A, with yearly number of crimes, ranking by prevalence of crime type 
in the province (if in top 10 of  province’s 78 precincts) and crime rates 
per 100 000 residents
2013 Provincial 
prevalence 
ranking
Per 
100 000 
residents
2014 Provincial 
prevalence 
ranking
Per 
100 000 
residents
2015 Provincial 
prevalence 
ranking
Per 
100 000 
residents
Unlawful 
possession of 
fire arms and 
ammunition
4 N/A 9.74 21 6th 51.13 16 10th 38.96
Common 
robbery
110 5th 267.82 96 6th 233.73 108 4th 262.95
Robbery with 
aggravating 
circumstances
308 3rd 803.45 330 2nd 803.45 352 2nd 857.01
Malicious 
injury to 
property
333 3rd 810.75 220 6th 535.63 188 8th 457.72
Burglary at 
non-residential 
premises
135 10th 328.68 131 9th 318.94 172 7th 418.77
Drug-related 
crime
302 7th 735.28 385 8th 937.35 433 7th 1 054.20
Robbery at 
non-residential 
premises
83 1st 202.08 76 3rd 185.03 70 2nd 170.43
Kidnapping 9 8th 21.91 14 5th 34.09 8 N/A 19.48
Burglary at 
residential 
premises
844 4th 2 054.88 651 4th 1 584.98 920 2nd 2 239.91
Robbery at 
residential 
premises
77 3rd 187.47 82 2nd 199.64 108 1st 262.95
Crimen injuria 
(stalking)
54 6th 131.47 41 N/A 99.82 25 N/A 60.87
Carjacking 13 5th 31.65 15 3rd 36.52 7 N/A 17.04
Table 1: Selected crimes committed in Town A in 2013, 2014 and 2015
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to transport stolen items from the centre, or 
used in an attack on the centre. Because it can 
be very difficult to determine the probability of 
an attack (PA) at a particular time, records of 
these types of crimes help to determine criminal 
risk in the area.  
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate a decrease in common 
robbery, malicious injury to property, burglary 
at non-residential premises and crimen injuria 
(stalking) from 2013 to 2014 in both Town 
A and Town B. In the same period there 
was an increase in robbery with aggravating 
circumstances, drug-related crime, carjacking 
and robbery at residential premises. Unlawful 
possession of arms and ammunition and 
kidnapping increased in Town A but decreased 
Crime
Town B, with yearly number of crimes, ranking by prevalence of crime type 
in the province (if in top 10 of  province’s 78 precincts) and crime rates 
per 100 000 residents
2013 Provincial 
prevalence 
ranking
Per 
100 000 
residents
2014 Provincial 
prevalence 
ranking
Per 
100 000 
residents
2015 Provincial 
prevalence 
ranking
Per 
100 000 
residents
Unlawful 
possession of 
fire arms and 
ammunition
9 N/A 2.88 8 N/A 2.56 15 N/A 4.80
Common 
robbery
164 2nd 52.46 133 2nd 42.54 114 2nd 36.47
Robbery with 
aggravating 
circumstances
205 6th 65.57 234 8th 74.85 236 7th 75.49
Malicious 
injury to 
property
260 5th 85.57 169 N/A 54.06 156 N/A 49.90
Burglary at 
non-residential 
premises
313 3rd 100.12 213 5th 68.13 268 4th 85.73
Drug-related 
crime
112 N/A 35.83 223 N/A 71.33 278 N/A 88.92
Robbery at 
non-residential 
premises
32 N/A 10.24 48 5th 15.35 50 5th 16.00
Kidnapping 19 1st 6.08 13 7th 4.16 9 8th 2.88
Burglary at 
residential 
premises
385 N/A 123.15 415 N/A 132.75 410 N/A 131.15
Robbery at 
residential 
premises
24 N/A 7.68 35 9th 11.20 34 N/A 10.88
Crimen injuria 
(stalking)
80 4th 25.59 46 8th 14.71 45 7th 14.40
Carjacking 9 9th 2.88 10 7th 3.20 5 N/A 1.60
Table 2: Selected crimes committed in Town B in 2013, 2014 and 2015
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in Town B in 2014, while burglary at 
residential premises and robbery at non-
residential premises decreased in Town A 
but increased in Town B in 2014, compared 
to 2013.
Again, the tables illustrate a decrease in 
carjacking, malicious injury to property, 
kidnapping and crimen injuria (stalking) 
from 2014 to 2015, in both Town A and 
Town B. In the same vein, burglary at non-
residential premises, robbery with aggravating 
circumstances and drug-related crime all 
increased in 2015 in both towns. Burglary at 
residential premises, common robbery and 
robbery at residential premises increased in 
Town A but decreased in Town B in 2015, 
whilst the unlawful possession of arms and 
ammunition, and robbery at non-residential 
premises decreased in Town A and increased in 
Town B in 2015, compared to 2014.
Despite these fluctuations in reported crime, 
police in towns A and B recorded more crime 
than all but nine other precincts in the province.  
The tables show the number of crimes, each 
with its corresponding crime rate per 100 000 
residents. Crime rates provide a more realistic 
picture of risk than do totals of recorded 
crime. In this case, the selected crimes were 
committed relatively consistently for the three-
year period of the study.
Types and methods of lawbreakers 
When formulating a DBT it is assumed that 
in any attack against a facility, there are 
three kinds of possible lawbreakers: outside 
lawbreakers (outsiders), inside lawbreakers 
(insiders who work at the facility) and outsiders 
working in collusion with insiders but not active 
in every attack.16 Outsiders can be a group of 
criminals, terrorists or extremists. There are two 
types of insider lawbreakers: passive and active. 
Insiders can collude with outsiders to help them 
defeat protective layers of the PPS while under 
duress (e.g. a threat to the life of his/her family) 
or willingly (part of the criminals, or not happy 
with a decision taken by management). 
There are three primary methods that 
lawbreakers may employ during an attack. 
One is deceit: the act or practice of deceiving 
someone by concealing or misrepresenting 
the facts. Stealth (movement that is quiet and 
careful in order not to be seen or heard, or 
a secret action) is another. The last method 
involves strength or energy as an attribute 
of physical action to coerce, especially with 
the use or threat of violence, commonly 
termed force.
Considering the nature and complexity of 
recorded crime in the towns surrounding the 
centre, including unlawful possession of 
firearms and ammunition, robbery with 
aggravating circumstances, robbery at 
residential and non-residential premises, and 
malicious damage to property, it is probable 
that all of these will involve the use of force. 
Deceit is more likely to form part of crimes such 
as common robbery, kidnapping and some 
crimen injuria, such as stalking. Stealth may be 
employed when entering premises to commit 
crimes such as burglary.
All three infiltrations that took place between 
2005 and 2012 at the Pelindaba nuclear 
facility, South Africa’s main nuclear research 
centre, run by the South African Nuclear 
Energy Corporation (NECSA), should inform 
the developer and evaluator of a DBT for 
CARST. The DBT should focus on the specific 
methods used by lawbreakers, and take into 
account technological advancements, in 
order to prevent future break-ins. In the 2005 
infiltration, protection measures were breached, 
enabling entry into the facility and theft of 
a portable computer.17 This breach could 
have been carried out by an outsider, or an 
outsider working in collusion with insiders. The 
lawbreakers might have defeated the security 
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system by deceit – using false authorisations 
and identification – or by stealth – an insider 
defeating the detection systems and enabling 
outsiders to enter the facility covertly. These 
methods could also be employed by either of 
the groups of lawbreakers mentioned above. 
In 2007 the lawbreakers probably used force 
to enter the facility, since they were armed, 
and managed to deactivate security layers 
and enter from different directions, in groups, 
simultaneously. There may also have been an 
element of stealth, since these armed men 
were able to penetrate the control room for 
a period of 45 minutes and escape without 
being detected. These attacks may have been 
masterminded by a certain group of people, 
e.g. criminal outsiders, disgruntled former or 
current employees, or a combination of the two. 
Similarly, the third violation of protective 
measures at the facility in 2012, described as 
an act of ‘common’ criminality, might have used 
stealth by an insider or deceit by an outsider 
working in collusion with an insider. Outcomes 
of the investigations of these three infiltrations 
have not been made public, but in 2010 the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) wrote to the IAEA, 
asking it to ensure that South Africa’s uranium 
stock, which can be used for nuclear weapons, 
was securely stored. DA spokesperson Pieter 
van Dalen asked the IAEA to help South Africa 
have its uranium downgraded. The party also 
asked the agency to get the South African 
government to disclose the outcome of an 
investigation into the 2007 security breach at 
Pelindaba, where the uranium was stored – but 
to no avail.18
Capabilities of lawbreakers
In formulating a DBT, it can be assumed that 
lawbreakers committing the above crimes may 
possess firearms and other tools like pliers, 
hacksaw blades, crowbars and knives. In 
addition to their own weapons and hand tools, 
they would probably use any other tool or piece 
of equipment found at the attacked premises 
that would facilitate their criminal objectives. 
Lawbreakers also use a range of transportation, 
including cars, trucks and helicopters, all of 
which must be taken into account. 
The aftermath of past attacks (such as the sarin 
attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, the attack 
on the World Trade Center in New York City in 
2001, anthrax attacks in New York and Florida 
in 2001 and the Madrid and London train 
bombings in 2004 and 2005, respectively) 
has compelled security analysts – in 
particular nuclear security professionals – to 
include weapons of mass destruction as an 
emerging lawbreaker capability and threat. 
These weapons include chemical, biological, 
radiological or explosive materials that have the 
ability to cause mass casualties, public fear and 
lasting contamination. 
The above information was used to guide 
the design of a PPS for CARST. It took into 
consideration all tactics, capabilities, types of 
attack and groups of people who might attack 
CARST, so as to put in place a PPS to protect 
the centre against these attacks.
Potential actions and 
motives of lawbreakers
When there is an attack at a facility, 
lawbreakers’ actions depend mainly on their 
goals, such as theft, sabotage, terrorism and 
political protest. 
The motives of lawbreakers might be 
ideological, economic, revenge (by former or 
current employees), or based on the belief 
that provincial leadership only responds to 
strike action and violence. In South Africa, and 
in the province where the centre is located, 
most crimes committed have to do with pride, 
masculinity, shame, upbringing, and a culture 
of violence at school and at home.19 Even if 
lawbreakers are driven by ideology, they still 
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expect to derive some self-fulfilment from their 
unlawful actions. Some Muslim extremists 
embrace martyrdom and sacrifice their lives to 
destroy and kill, in the belief that the afterlife 
holds sufficient reward, as promised in the 
Quran.20 Certain companies pay criminals to 
destroy the facilities and equipment of others in 
the same line of business. Personal vendettas 
might lead lawbreakers to covertly steal vital 
information with the intention to blackmail and 
destroy reputations.   
Results: Design Basis 
Threat statements
According to the IAEA’s Code of Conduct, a 
categorisation system for radioactive sources 
should be maintained so that measures to 
control and secure are commensurate with the 
radiological risks.21 This categorisation system is 
based on the potential that radioactive sources 
have to cause deterministic health effects, 
which only appear after threshold values are 
exceeded and for which the severity of effect 
increases with an increasing dose beyond the 
threshold. The value of the source’s activity (A), 
divided by its dangerous value (D), determines 
the category and the extent of damage it can 
cause. A radioactive material can be said to be 
‘dangerous’ if it can cause permanent injury or 
be immediately life threatening if not managed 
safely and securely. Radioactive sources are 
grouped into five categories; category one being 
the most dangerous. 
In the two towns surrounding CARST there is 
a significant amount of criminal activity during 
the day and at night. Communities know of 
the university and its facilities, including the 
irradiator and other equipment, but there has 
been little formal interest in it to date other than 
from students and researchers. 
There have been two organised protests at 
the university, in 2008 and 2015. Student 
activists and others protested and vandalised 
grocery and computer accessory shops on one 
of the three campuses of the university. The 
two protests received a great deal of media 
attention. The student activists were able to 
drive the university security guards off the 
campus and the police were only contacted 
once the university had been forced to close. 
Based on the above assessment, the designer 
of a physical protection system of nuclear 
facilities housing category 1–3 radioactive 
sources should consider the determination, 
violent nature and methods of both potential 
insider and outsider lawbreakers, either 
by stealth or deceptive actions. These 
considerations should also be applied to a 
minimum of two to three lawbreakers who 
may attack at any time during the day or night, 
with determination and violence. The following 
should be noted:
• Insider lawbreakers may be trained and 
possess skills in handling radioactive material. 
They may also have hand tools to help them 
break through barriers or assist an outsider to 
do so.
• Knowledgeable individuals who work in the 
facilities may provide insider assistance in 
an attempt to participate in a more passive 
role, for instance, facilitating entrance and 
exit, disabling alarms and communications, 
and participating in non-violent attacks. Such 
internal threats can arise from any employee 
in any of the positions at the facility.
• The conspiracy between individuals in the 
facility and outsiders may entail access to and 
detailed knowledge of nuclear power plants 
or other nuclear facilities, and/or items that 
could facilitate theft of nuclear materials – for 
example, small tools, false documents, 
 facility keys and pass codes and substitute 
nuclear material.
• Lawbreakers’ weapons, which the PPS and 
the security response team should be able to 
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overcome or counter, will likely include pistols, 
since there are a number of crimes involving 
the unlawful possession of firearms and 
ammunition in surrounding towns.
• Lawbreakers will most probably have access 
to vehicles, from either carjacking or rentals, 
for transporting radioactive materials from 
the site. Specialist vehicles are normally used 
for transporting radioactive materials, but 
lawbreakers may not be aware of the risk 
associated with transporting a radioactive 
source close to their bodies. 
Conclusion
A DBT statement is essential when designing a 
PPS, from the threat assessment to the facility’s 
assets. In the threat assessment conducted 
for CARST, attention was duly given to crimes 
recorded in the surrounding towns. There is 
a high risk of contamination and unwarranted 
radiation exposure if there is a security breach 
at the centre. This would become a financial 
burden for the country and the university, 
since significant resources would be needed 
for decontamination and the treatment of 
anyone exposed to harmful materials or 
radiation. The three successful infiltrations at 
Pelindaba illustrate that any nuclear facility is 
at risk, including CARST. Because it is difficult 
to ascertain exactly when a lawbreaker might 
attack a facility (see Equation 1), security 
experts must consider all the consequences 
of a potential breach. If the consequence is 
serious, then the risk is also serious. The DBT 
statements that were derived from the CARST 
threat assessment enable policymakers and 
security agencies to make informed decisions 
in designing and evaluating their physical 
protection systems. These assessments and 
DBT statements also enable the competent 
authority for nuclear security to consider which 
PPS to approve when applications are made. 
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